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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1) Does Appellants1 failure to cite to the record and 
failure to support their claim of error with an adequate record 
of the facts constitute grounds for summary affirmance? 
2) Did the district court judge properly find that an 
extraordinary writ is an inappropriate remedy? 
3) Was there an appropriate remedy of appeal available 
to Appellants which precluded the district court from granting an 
extraordinary writ? 
4) Does the district court have supervisory power over 
the circuit court? 
5) Did the district court judge properly refuse to 
reach the merits of the case? 
6) Did the district court1s ruling that appellant 
failed to join an indispensable party prejudice Appellant? 
-iv-
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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF 
UTAH, CACHE COUNTY, SECOND 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
RICH COUNTY, TED S. PERRY, 
Circuit Judge, and DAVID W. 
SORENSON, Circuit Judge, 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants petitioned the Second District Court for a 
writ of prohibition claiming the Second Circuit Court acted 
without authority in forfeiting certain bonds and revoking the 
bonding privileges of Appellants in that court. The district 
court refused to exercise supervisory power over the circuit 
court and found that an extraordinary writ was an inappropriate 
remedy. Consequently, the district court denied Appellants 
petition without reaching the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are bail bondsmen who, prior to the 
initiation of this action in the Second District Court, were 
qualified to post bonds in the Second Circuit Court (T. 14, R. 
47). Respondents Ted S. Perry and David W. Sorenson preside as 
Case No. 24155 
Category No. 13b 
circuit judges in the Second Circuit Court (T. 30, 38). Bondsman 
Edwin 0. Tolman issued bonds in the Second Circuit Court in 
behalf of four criminal defendants; Kathy Garcia, Lyle B. Haws, 
Lester J. Robertson, and David R. Minor (T. 14, 16, 21, 23). 
Defendants Garcia and Haws failed to make themselves subject to 
the Second Circuit Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of 
executing sentences imposed by that court (T. 48-49). 
Defendant's Robertson and Minor failed to appear for arraignment 
and trial, respectively (T. 49). Judge Perry ordered each bond 
forfeited (T. 32). Appellants did not appeal Judge Perry's 
forfeiture rulings to the district court (T. 32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court properly found that an extraordinary 
writ is an inappropriate remedy in the instant case. An 
appropriate remedy would have been a direct appeal to the 
district court from the forfeiture judgments of the circuit 
court. Failure to raise that appeal constitutes a waiver. 
Furthermore, pursuant to the constitution of Utah, Article VIII 
§ 5, the district court no longer has supervisory authority over 
circuit courts. Consequently, the district court properly 
refused to reach the merits of the case as to whether Appellants 
are liable for the forfeited bonds or should be reinstated as 
qualified to write bonds in the second circuit court. 
A collateral issue is presented by whether Appellants 
failed to join an indispensable party. The district court's 
ruling is unsupported by case law, but Appellants were not 
prejudiced and therefore, reversal is not warranted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS FAILED TO CITE TO THE RECORD IN 
THEIR BRIEF AS REQUIRED BY RULE 24(a) (6)
 f 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, WHICH 
CONSTITUTES GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE. 
Rule 24(a)(6), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985) 
provides in pertinent part: 
There shall follow a statement of facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review. 
All statement of facts and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record. 
Appellants failed to support their claim of error with an 
adequate record of the facts and failed to cite to the record. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's 
findings. State v. Gardea. 22 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Nov. 18, 1985); 
State v. Sutton. 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Oct. 2, 1985). 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS* REQUEST FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 5 
(effective July 1, 1985), district courts have the power to issue 
all extraordinary writs. However, that power is limited to 
situations in which no other remedy is available and substantial 
injustice would otherwise occur. It is a well established 
principle that an extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for 
general review. Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 
(1956); 01 sen v. District Court. Second Judicial District. 106 
Utah 220, 147 P.2d 471 (1944); Robinson v. City Court of Opden. 
112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1947); Chesney v. District Court of 
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Salt Lake County, 108 P.2d 514 (Utah 1941). Rule 65B(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent partf "where no 
other plain, speedy, adequate remedy exists, relief may be 
obtained by appropriate action under these rules . • • ." 
[Emphasis added]• 
Applying Rule 65B, this Court has held that if the 
lower court is proceeding without jurisdiction, but it appears 
that there is an adequate remedy, a writ should generally not 
issue. Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939). Also 
if there is no want or excess of jurisdiction and an adequate 
remedy exists, a writ should never issue. Qlsen v. District 
£aiir±, supra. Furthermore, this Court held that if there was an 
adequate remedy of appeal from a lower court that has 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and the 
party permits it to lapse, he does so at his peril and an 
extraordinary writ should not lie. Anderson v. Baker. 5 Utah 2d 
33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956). 
Applying these findings to the instant case, because it 
is not contested that the Second Circuit Court has jurisdiction 
over Appellants, the critical issue becomes whether direct appeal 
was available to Appellants as an appropriate remedy. 
POINT III 
APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT COURT PROM THE CIRCUIT 
COURT'S FORFEITURE RULING WAS AN APPROPRIATE 
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO APPELLANTS WHICH 
PRECLUDED THE DISTRICT COURT FROM GRANTING AN 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT. 
Appellants contend that the district judge erred in not 
granting a writ of prohibition. Appellants also recognize that 
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if the district judge concluded that an appeal was an appropriate 
remedy, his denial of the extraordinary writ would be warranted. 
Appellants cite People V. Tremayner a 1884 Utah casef for the 
proposition that appeal is not available from a bail forfeiture 
order. 3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85 (1884). Although Tremayne has not 
been overruled, Appellants candidly admit that the holding is 
incorrect in light of recent statutory revisions and many well-
reasoned cases from other jurisdictions which allow appeals from 
bail forfeiture rulings. (See Appellant's brief at 5). 
Moreover, this Court entertained an appeal from a 
circuit court bail forfeiture order which had been appealed to 
the district court. Walton v» Circuit Court/ No. 16281 (Utah 
1979) (See Appendix A). Appealability of a bond forfeiture order 
was not an issue, but the case was successfully appealed to the 
district court and the district court order was appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court. This Court did not mention Tremayne in its 
decision. Consequently, bond forfeiture orders appear to be 
appealable in Utah, notwithstanding Tremayne. 
Appeal procedures from the circuit court to the 
district court are provided for by law. Constitution of Utah, 
Article VIII § 5 (1985); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-4, 78-3-5, and 
78-4-11 (1953, as amended). An appeal lies from judgments 
obtained pursuant to the Bail Forfeiture Procedure Act, § 77-20a-
1 et. seq. (1983). There have been no decisions by this Court 
construing the provisions of that Act. However, cases in other 
jurisdictions with substantially similar provisions have held 
that orders dealing with the forfeiture of bail are appealable. 
-5-
People v. Wilcox. 53 Cal.2d 651, 2 Cal. Rptr. 754r 349 P.2d 522 
(1960); Smaldon v. United States, 211 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1954); 
United States v. Cardina Casualty Ins. Co,. 237 F.2d 451 (7th 
Cir. 1956); State v. Cotton, 172 La. 295, 110 So. 480 (1926); 
State v. Wright. 51 Wash.2d 606, 320 P.2d 646 (1958). 
Therefore, Appellants should have availed themselves of 
the proper judicial remedies and procedures pursuant to the Bail 
Forfeiture Procedures Act and filed a timely appeal. A failure 
to do so constituted a waiver. Consequently, the Second District 
Court properly held that relief in the form of an extraordinary 
writ was not warranted. 
POINT IV 
PURSUANT TO A CONSTITUTIONAL REPEAL AND 
REENACTMENT, DISTRICT COURTS NO LONGER HAVE 
GENERAL SUPERVISORY POWER OVER CIRCUIT COURTS 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Appellants rely on Hillyard v. Logan City Court, 57 8 
P.2d 1270 (Utah 1978) and Wells v. City Court of Logan, 535 P.2d 
683 (Utah 1975) for the proposition that the district court has 
supervisory authority over circuit courts. Both cases were 
decided when the Constitution of Utah specifically enumerated 
such a power. However, a recent amendment to the Constitution of 
Utah has removed the supervisory power district courts previously 
had over circuit courts. Article VIII § 5 of the constitution of 
Utahf effective July 1, 1985, states as follows: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power 
to issue all extraordinary writs. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute. Except for matters filed originally 
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with the supreme court, there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
The prior Constitutional provision, Article VIIIf § 7, 
granting jurisdiction to the district court provided: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
same. The district courts or any judge 
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give 
them a general control over inferior courts 
and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions. [Emphasis added.] 
The former provision of the constitution granted the 
district court supervisory control over inferior courts. The new 
constitutional provision conspicuously omitted the language 
dealing with the district courts supervisory powers over inferior 
courts, i.e. circuit courts. When the new constitutional 
provision took effect, this provision specifically removed any 
prior supervisory authority the district court had over the 
circuit court under the repealed provisions. 
Section 78-3-4 of the District Court Act, enacted in 
1953 and amended in 1983, provides: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
sam£. The district courts, or any judges 
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
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warranto^ certiorari, prohibition, and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give 
them a general control over inferior courts 
and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
This provision was enacted pursuant to the authority specified in 
Article VIII, § 7 of the prior Constitutional article and grants 
to the district court supervisory authority over inferior courts, 
in conformity with the prior constitutional provision. With the 
adoption of the new Judicial article, that portion of § 7 8-3-4 
granting the district court supervisory authority over inferior 
courts is inconsistent with the new Article VIII, § 5. 
As a general principle, a statute existing at the 
adoption of a Constitution or constitutional amendment cannot be 
upheld if it is opposed to the plain terms of the Constitution. 
In such a case, the statute may be regarded as repealed by the 
constitutional provision by implication. United States v. Mack, 
295 U.S. 480 (1935); Massey v. United States. 291 U.S. 608 
(1934); United States v. Chambers. 291 U.S. 217 (1934); National 
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Veterans' Welfare Bdt V. 
&ilgy, 189 Cal. 159, 208 P. 678 (1922); Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio 
226, 98 NE2d 401 (1951) . 
The final test in determining whether a statute is 
repealed by implication by a constitutional provision is: Does 
the legislature have the present right to enact statutes 
substantially like the statute in question under the new 
constitutional provision. Monaghan v« Lewis, 5 Penn. 218, 59 A. 
948 (Deleware 1905). 
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In applying this test to the instant case, the 
Legislature has the right to enact a statute substantially like 
§ 78-3-4, except for the supervisory language. The Legislature 
does not have the right to enact a statute which would grant to 
the district courts supervisory powers over inferior courts. 
Further, if the authority of the Legislature to enact a 
particular statute is derived solely from a particular 
constitutional provision, a repeal of such provision operates as 
a repeal of the statute. United States v. Cnnstantine. 296 U.S. 
287, 80 L.Ed. 233, 56 S.Ct. 223 (1935). United States v. 
Chambers, supra. Therefore, a repeal of the constitutional 
provisions dealing with the district courts supervisory authority 
over inferior courts operates as a repeal of those provisions of 
§ 78-3-4 granting supervisory powers of the district court over 
inferior courts. 
Section 4 of the Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, Laws 
1984 (2d S.S.), providing for the repeal and reenactment of 
Article VIII, states in part: 
Existing statutes and rules on the effective 
date [July 1, 1985] of this amendment 
[Article VIII], not inconsistent with it, 
shall continue in force and effect until 
repealed or changed by statute. 
This savings clause inserted by the Legislature provides that all 
statutes in force and not inconsistent with the new 
constitutional provision shall continue until amended or repealed 
by the Legislature. However, by this enactment, the Legislature 
recognized that inconsistent statutes cannot continue in force 
and are therefore repealed by implication. Therefore, those 
-9-
provisions of § 7 8-3-4 granting such supervisory powers to the 
district court cannot be saved and are of no effect* 
The powers given the district court by constitutional 
provision cannot be enlarged or abridged by the Legislature. 
Robinson V. Durandr 36 Utah 93, 104 P. 760 (1908). The district 
court is limited to those powers granted it by the Constitution. 
StLtCt Vt Christensen Co,, 34 Utah 38, 95 p. 523 (1939); 
Wadsworth v, Santaquin City. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); 
National Tunnel & Mines Co. v» Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 
102 P.2d 508 (1940). Therefore, the district court properly 
refused to exercise supervisory authority over the circuit court 
pursuant to constitutional mandate. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
REACH THE MERITS WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER 
APPELLANTS ARE LIABLE FOR THE FORFEITED BONDS 
OR SHOULD BE REINSTATED AS QUALIFIED TO WRITE 
BONDS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT. 
As argued above, the district court properly denied 
Appellants1 petition for an extraordinary writ and refused to 
exercise supervisory authority over the circuit court. These 
rulings prevented the district court from reaching the merits of 
the case because to do so would have been in excess of its 
jurisdiction and authority. Moreover, because the district court 
is without supervisory authority over the circuit court, the 
district court judge properly refused to review the 
qualifications of bondsmen to issue bonds in the circuit court. 
Furthermore, because Appellants failed to appeal the 
circuit court's forfeiture rulings with regard to the terms of 
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the bonds to the district court, they waived that right. 
Anderson v. Bakerf supra. Consequently, Appellants are compelled 
to comply with the circuit court findings due to their own 
inaction. Finally, Appellants claim that once granted, the right 
to issue bonds becomes a property interest and may not be revoked 
without due process. However, Appellants fail to state facts or 
refer to the record to support its claim of error. Therefore, 
this Court should affirm on this point without considertion. 
State v, Gardea, 22 ot. Adv. Rep. 11 (Nov. 18, 1985). 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURTS RULING THAT THE CASE WAS 
NOT JUSTICIABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF CERTAIN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS A COLLATERAL ISSUE 
WHICH HAS NO SIGNIFICANT BEARING ON THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The d i s t r i c t court judge determined that certa in 
indispensable p a r t i e s were absent and the case was therefore not 
j u s t i c i a b l e . I t appears from the f indings of fact that Judge 
Wahlquist considered the criminal defendants who f a i l e d to appear 
in the cases before the Second Circui t Court indispensable 
p a r t i e s to the act ion brought by Appel lants . The State i s unable 
to find any authority to support that p o s i t i o n . 
However, Appellants were not prejudiced by the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s ru l ing . I t i s we l l e s tab l i shed in Utah that t h i s Court 
w i l l only reverse a lower court dec i s ion i f there i s a reasonable 
l i k e l i h o o d tha t , absent the error, the r e s u l t would have been 
more favorable to the complaining party. In Rg Estate of Kesler r 
702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985) . 
- 1 1 -
In the instant casef the district court's ruling with 
regard to the absence of indispensable parties had absolutely no 
impact on the rights or liabilities of the parties. Particularly 
in light of the district court's findings that an extraordinary 
writ was inappropriate and its refusal to exercise supervisory 
authority over the circuit court. Therefore, such an 
inconsequential error does not warrant reversal of an otherwise 
sound decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the 
findings of the district court in denying Appellants' petition 
for an extraordinary writ, in refusing to exercise supervisory 
authority over the circuit court, and in refusing to reach the 
merits. 
DATED this // day of April, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DIANE W. WILKINS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to A.W. Lauritzen, 
Attorney for Appellant, 3 26 North 100 East, P.O. Box 171, Logan, 
Utah 84321, this // day of April, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Vincent P. Walton, et al.f No. 16281 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. F I L E D 
December 12, 1979 
Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City 
Department, and the Honorable 
Maurice D. Jones, Circuit Judge, 
Defendants and Appellants. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendants appeal from an adverse summary judgment 
ordering the exoneration of the undertakings of the bail bonds 
of four defendants in cases filed in the Salt Lake City Court, 
now the Circuit Court. Each of the four defendants had been 
charged in the Salt Lake City Court with a misdemeanor and had 
been admitted to bail on undertakings complying with the re-
quirements of Section 77-43-13, U.C.A. 1953, furnished by the 
plaintiff. In the course of the proceedings, each defendant 
had been convicted or had entered a guilty plea, and had 
personally appeared in court and been sentenced to pay a fine 
of $150.00. Some records pertaining to the cases have been 
lost. However, the documents available indicate that the 
sentence was to pay a fine and they do not show that any jail 
sentence had been imposed as a part of any sentence, nor to 
enforce payment of any fine. The court gave each defendant 
30 days to pay the fine, which period expired without payment. 
Proceedings were instituted against the bondsman on the theory 
that the undertaking in the bail bonds required the bondsman 
to pay any fine imposed if the defendants failed to pay as 
ordered. All four bonds were ordered to be forfeited. The 
bondsman sought relief in the District Court, and obtained a 
judgment ordering, among other things, that the Circuit Court 
exonerate the undertakings in bail and release the bondsman 
from liability. 
The liability of the bondsman is determined by the 
terms of the suretyship undertaking. There is no express 
requirement in the language of the undertaking that imposes 
liability on the bondsman for payment of any fine. There is 
a statement "that the defendant will render himself in execu-
tion of the judgment." This statement presupposes that the 
judgment is one that provides for imprisonment or for imprison-
ment to enforce payment of a fine. A judgment limited to a 
fine constitutes a lien, upon which an execution may be issued 
as on a judgment in a civil action. 
In the words of Justice Cordoza: "In the discretion 
of the court the judgment may direct that the defendant shall 
be imprisoned until the fine is paid. If the direction for 
imprisonment is omitted, the remedy by execution is exclusive. 
Imprisonment does not follow automatically upon a showing of 
default in payment. It follows, if at all, because the con-
sequence has been prescribed in the imposition of the sentence. 
The choice of pains and penalties, when choice is committed 
to the discretion of the court, is part of the judicial func-
tion. This being so, it must have expression in the sentence, 
and the sentence is the judgment.ff Hill v. United States, 
298 U.S. 460, 80 L. Ed. 1283, 56 S. Ct. 760. 
When fines only were imposed against the four de-
fendants, they could no longer be subjected to any detention 
on the charges and judgments against then. The purpose for the 
bail bonds had been fulfilled, and their bondsman was released 
from any further liability. 
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. No 
costs awarded. 
Wilkins, Justice, does not participate herein. 
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